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applied in California law can at times be irreconcilable, and will rectify the situation in such a way as to retain the integrity of section 1151 while limiting the
exception to those situations wherein it serves a worthwhile judicial function.
Malcolm E. McLorg*
* Member,

Third Year Class.

PER DIEM DAMAGES: THE CONTROVERSY
CONTINUES
In 1951, the renowned San Francisco lawyer, Melvin Belli, promulgated his
thesis on converting pain and suffering into dollars and cents by a means which
has come to be known as the per diem method of computing damages.1 Basically,
the per diem method consists of dividing the plaintiff's life into components of
time and determining damages on a period to period basis.2 The manner in which
the argument is used is best described in the words of Mr. Belli hmself:
This is the key- you must break up the
life expectancy into finite detailed
periods of time. You must take these small periods of time, seconds and minutes,
and determine in dollars and cents what each period is worth.
You must start at the beginning and show that pain is a continuous thing,
second by second, minute by minute, hour by hour, and year after year
You must interpret one second, one minute, one hour, one year of pain and
suffering into dollars and cents and then multiply to your absolute figure to
a
show how you achieved your result
This innovation in jury argument created a storm of controversy which has yet to
subside.4 The reasons given for the existence of the controversy are numerous.
Yet when carefully examined, one invariably stands out; the per diem argument
results in larger awards.
The Controversy
For over one hundred years, the measure of damages for pain and suffering
has been "fair and reasonable" compensation. 5 It is agreed by both the advocates
and the assailants of the per diem argument that this is the proper standard on
1

Belli, Demonstrative Evidence and the Adequate Award, 22 Miss. L.J. 284
(1951); see Moms, An Audio-visual Study of Pain and Suffering in Dollars-on-a-Unitof-Time Basis From June 2, 1951, 14 D.EFENSE LJ. 129 (1965).
2
Belli, supra note 1, at 318.
3Ibid.
4 For an extensive list of articles written on both sides of the argument, see Beagle
v. Vasold, 65 A.C. 161, 170, 53 Cal. Rptr. 129, 133, 417 P.2d 673, 677 (1966).
5 See, e.g., Armsworth v. South Eastern By. 11 Jur. 758 (Surry Summer Assizes,
Croyden 1847); Stocton v. Frey, 4 Gill 406, 424, 45 Am. Dec. 138, 144 (Md. 1846)
(dictum).
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which the ]ury should base its ]udgment; 6 but here their agreement comes to an
end. The advocates contend that the per diem formula is merely a means to assist
the ]ury in attaining the 'fair and reasonable 1 award, while the assailants retort
that it effectually abolishes the "fair and reasonable" criteria.8
As might be expected m light of this divergence of opinion, there are strong
arguments on both sides. Those who oppose the per diem formula contend that it
is used to mislead the ]ury by creating an illusion of certainty,9 which can very
easily result in excessive awards through shrewd manipulation of the unit of time
employed by the plaintiffs counsel.' 0 For example, if counsel successfully argues
that the plaintiffs pain is worth a penny a minute for his thirty year life expectancy, the award will be about 158,000 dollars. However, were he to argue
for a penny a second, the same plaintiff would receive about 9,500,000 dollars.
The proponents of the per diem argument, on the other hand, contend that the
purpose of the argument is to give the ]urors a more explicit comprehension of
the plaintiffs pain and suffering." They feel that the traditional criteria used to
determine compensation provides little assistance to the ]ury and that pain and
suffering may be more meaningful when measured in short periods of time. They
further argue that if the award is excessive,
it can be reduced by the trial court
2
or reversed by the appellate court.1
Another argument which is frequently employed by the opponents of the
formula is that compensation for pain and suffering cannot be calculated mathematically.'8 They contend that there is no yardstick by which pain can accurately
be measured. Furthermore, when such calculations are attempted, no allowance
is made for the gradual elimination of pain, or for the accomodation to pam.' 4
More important, they do not allow for the variations in pain between individ6 Compare Caylor v. Atchison, T. & S.F By., 190 Kan. 261, 277, 374 P.2d 53, 64
(1962) (dissenting opinion), with Botta v. Brunner, 26 N.J. 82, 138 A.2d 713 (1958).
7 See, e.g., Ratner v. Arrington, 111 So. 2d 82 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1959); 4-County
Elec.8Power Ass'n v. Clardy, 221 Miss. 403, 73 So. 2d 144 (1954).
See, e.g., Caylor v. Atchison, T. & S.F By., 190 Kan. 261, 374 P.2d 53 (1962);

Affett v. Milwaukee & Suburban Transp. Corp., 11 Wis. 2d 604, 106 N.W.2d 274
(1960).
)Franco v. Fujimoto, 47 Hawaii 408, 420, 390 P.2d 740, 748 (1964); Caley v.
Mamcke, 29 Il. App. 2d 323, 173 N.E.2d 209 (1961) (dissenting opinion); Affett v.
Milwaukee & Suburban Transp. Corp., 11 Wis. 2d 604, 106 N.W.2d 274 (1960); Seffert
v. Los Angeles Transit Lines, 56 Cal. 2d 498, 513-14, 15 Cal. Rptr. 161, 170-71, 364
P.2d 337, 346-47 (1961) (dissenting opinion).

10 See Ablstrom v. Minneapolis, St. P. & S. Ste. M. R.R., 244 Minn. 1, 30, 68

N.W.2d 873, 891 (1955); Seffert v. Los Angeles Transit Lines, 56 Cal. 2d 498, 514,
15 Cal. Rptr. 161, 171, 364 P.2d 337, 347 (1961) (dissenting opinion).
"1Beagle v. Vasold, 65 A.C. 161, 53 Cal. Rptr. 129, 417 P.2d 673 (1966); Texas &
N.O.R.R. v. Flowers, 336 S.W.2d 907 (Tex. Civ. App. 1960); see 12 Rurcimis L. REv.
522 (1958); 1962 TriAL LAW. GuIDE 69.
12E.g., Ratner v. Arnngton, 111 So. 2d 82 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1959); see, 60
Micar. L. REv. 612 (1962); 28 U. Cmc. L. REv. 138 (1959).
13 Franco v. Fujimoto, 47 Hawaii 408, 390 P.2d 740 (1964); Botta v. Brunner, 26
N.J. 82, 138 A.2d 713 (1958); Affett v. Milwaukee & Suburban Transp. Corp., 11 Wis.
2d 604, 106 N.W.2d 274 (1960).
14 Caylor v. Atchison, T. & S.F Ry., 190 Kan. 261, 374 P.2d 53 (1962); Botta v.
Brunner, supra note 13.
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uals;i 5 it is a commonly known fact that no two persons bear the same sensitivity
to pare. For these reasons, the decision as to the amount of money which will
reasonably compensate the plaintiff for the pamn he has suffered has been traditionally left to the common sense of the jurors, and any suggestion as to how they
should compute such compensation is an intrusion into their domam.O To tins,
the proponents reply that plaintiffs counsel no more invades the domain of the
jury by suggesting that it measure damages on a per diem basis than he does by
suggesting that it find the defendant negligent.. 7 It is further argued that it is
the historic role of the advocate to seek to persuade the jurors to accept the logic
and reasoning of is position, and suggesting that they use the per diem formula
to compute damages does no more than that.' s
A tird argument by those who oppose the use of the per diem formula is
that any amount of money proposed by the plaintiff's counsel during the per diem
argument is neither based on facts in evidence nor inferable therefrom. 19 However, the jurors will mistakenly assume that the suggested amounts are evidence,
and the speculative figures, although madmissible as evidence, will thereby be
implanted in their minds. 20 Diametrically opposed to tins view is that of the
proponents. They feel that the amount of compensation is inferable from the
evidence, and since counsel is allowed to argue all reasonable inferences, he
should not be precluded from arguing compensation. 21 As to the possibility that
the argument will be mistaken as evidence, they feel that this can be prevented
through proper instructions.22
Beagle v. Vasold
The latest development in the per diem conflict is seen in the recent California
decision, Beagle v. Vasold.23 Prior to the Beagle decision, of thirty two jurisdictions having passed on the issue, twenty one permitted an attorney to use the
argument, while eleven had ruled against it.24 California had not squarely met
the problem. 25 However, in Beagle, the California Supreme Court, with considerable forthrightness, aligned itself with the majority. Justice Mosk, speaking
for the court, vigorously attacked the leading case representing the minority view,
15 Botta v. Brunner, 26 N.J. 82, 138 A.2d 713 (1958); Certified T.V & Appliance
Co. v. Harrmgton, 201 Va. 109, 109 S.E.2d 126 (1959).
'O E.g., Botta v. Brunner, supra note 15.
17 E.g., Beagle v. Vasold, 65 A.C. 161, 53 Cal. Rptr. 129, 417 P.2d 673 (1966).
's Caley v. Manicke, 29 Ill. App. 2d 323, 173 N.E.2d 209 (1961); see 12 RvTGmis
L. REv. 522 (1958); 1962 TnIAI. LAw. GumE 69.

19Botta v. Brunner, 26 N.J. 82, 138 A.2d 713 (1958); Certified T.V & Appliance
Co. v.
Harrington, 201 Va. 109, 109 S.E.2d 126 (1959).
20
Henne v. Balick, 51 Del. 369, 146 A.2d 394 (1958); Ahlstroin v. Minneapolis,
St. P. & S. Ste. M. Ry., 244 Minn. 1, 68 N.W.2d 873 (1955); Faught v. Washain, 329

S.W.2d
588 (Mo. 1959).
21
Crum v. Steel City Transp. Inc., 146 W Va. 421, 458, 122 S.E.2d 18, 38 (1961)
(dissenting opnion); see 12 Rutcris L. REv. 522 (1958).
22
See 38 Cir.-KENr L. REv. 62 (1960); 12 D.E PATUL L. REv. 317, 322 (1963).
23 65 A.C. 161, 53 Cal. Rptr. 129, 417 P.2d 673 (1966).
24
See Beagle v. Vasold, 65 A.C. 161, 168-70, 53 Cal. Rptr. 129, 132-33, 417 P.2d

673, 2676-77
(1966).
5
But see Seffert v. Los Angeles Transit Lines, 56 Cal. 2d 498, 512, 15 Cal. Rptr.
161, 170, 364 P.2d 337, 346 (1961) (dissenting opinion).

NOTES

Marcha, 1967]

Botta v. Brunner,2 6 in which the Supreme Court of New Jersey held that counsel
for the plaintiff could not argue damages on a per diem basis. The Botta court
felt that any amount of money counsel suggested would not be founded upon
facts in evidence nor would it be inferable therefrom.2 7 Beagle attacks this conclusion on the grounds that counsel is permitted to discuss all reasonable inferences, 28 and therefore:

if the jury from what it sees and hears at the trial must infer that a certain
amount of money is warranted as compensation for the plaintiffs pain and
suffenng, there is no justification for prohibiting counsel from making a similar
deduction m argument. 28a
The court apparently takes as axiomatic the proposition that the amount of compensation awarded by the jury is an inference. It would seem, however, that this
conclusion is open to doubt.
The Califorma Evidence Code defines an inference as "a deduction of fact
that may logically and reasonably be drawn from another fact or group of facts
found or otherwise established in the action."2 9 This language has been interpreted to mean that an inference can be drawn only from facts, that it must be
reasonably and logically drawn and that it may not be based on supposition,
conjecture, or guesswork. 0
In any given case, the only proven fact from which an inference can be drawn
as to the compensation to be awarded is that the plaintiff has and/or will suffer X
intensity of pamn for Y amount of time. However, to determine compensation, the
jury must know not only the intensity and duration of pain, but also the value of
pain at the proven level of intensity. Since no one can know the value in dollars
and cents of any given intensity of pain, the judge cannot give the jury a standard
to follow, nor may any witness express his opinion on the matter.3 ' Thus the value
of pamn, which is essential to the computation of compensation, must be arrived at
solely by speculation.
Since an inference must be drawn from the facts in evidence, and cannot be
based on supposition, and since the jury's determination of compensation Is based
on supposition as to the value of pain, the determination is apparently not an
inference. As one authority on damages said, "Transplanting pain and anguish
"132
into dollars can, at best, be only an arbitrary allowance
2626

N.J. 82, 138 A.2d 713 (1958).

27 Id. at 100, 138 A.2d at 723.
28 Beagle v. Vasold, 65 A.C. 161,

172, 53 Cal. Rptr. 129, 134, 417 P.2d 673, 678

(1966).

28a Ibid. (Emphasis added.)
29 CAL. EVMENCE CODE § 600(b).

It should be noted that when Beagle was de-

cided, the Evidence Code was not yet in effect. However, Evidence Code § 600 is
almost identical to Code of Civil Procedure §§ 1958, 1960, which were m effect when
Beagle was decided.
30 Cothran v. Town Council, 209 Cal. App. 2d 647, 26 Cal. Rptr. 319 (1962);
Towt v. Pope, 168 Cal. App. 2d 520, 336 P.2d 276 (1959).
31 Little Rock, M.R. & T. Ry. v. Haynes, 47 Ark. 497, 1 S.W 774 (1886); DeWald
v. Ingle, 31 Wash. 616, 72 Pac. 469 (1903); Beagle v. Vasold, 65 A.C. 161, 53 Cal.
Rptr. 129, 417 P.2d 673 (1966) (dicta). See McComc, DA AGES § 88, at 318
(1935); WIGMOBE, EvmmEcE § 1944, at 55-56 (3d ed. 1940).
2
3 McCopmjcs, DAmAmCs § 88, at 318-19 (1935).
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Since the amount of money winch will fairly compensate the plaintiff for his
pain and suffering does not appear to be an inference from the evidence, it seems
only logical that counsel should be precluded from arguing not only per diem
damages, but also total damages. However, California has consistently permitted
argument of the latter.83 The Beagle court felt that it would be paradoxical to
prevent the plaintiff's counsel from arguing per diem damages and at the same
time allow him to argue total damages.3 4 This would be true were it not for the
inherent danger in the per diem argument, not present in the argument on total
damages.
The danger in the per diem argument lies in the illusion of certainty it creates.3 5 It is not difficult to see why the argument is deceiving. Generally, people
(including members of a jury) have become accustomed to using formulas they
do not understand. For example, the average person cannot explain why the area
of a circle is arrived at by multiplying the radius times itself times 3.14, but with
full confidence in the correctness of the result, he uses the formula A = Pi (1R2)
And similarly when counsel presents the jury with a mathematical formula which
appears to be valid, they are likely to utilize it. This is especially true when the
formula makes the solution of an almost insurmountable problem a matter of
simple mathematics, just as algebraic and geometric formulas simplify even the
most complex mathematical problems.
It is conceded that if the formula were valid, it would unquestionably be of
great value to the jury. However, it is not valid. To use the formula, some amount
must be chosen for each period, whether it is a second or a year. Since there is
no basis in human experience for testing the reasonableness of the amount decided upon, almost any amount will seem reasonable on its face. For example, is
ten dollars, fifty dollars, or one hundred dollars a day reasonable compensation
for permanent paralysis? If ten dollars per day is used for a person with a life
expectancy of thirty years, an award of about 110,000 dollars is reached. If one
hundred dollars per day is used, the award is slightly less than 1,100,000 dollars.
While neither ten dollars nor one hundred dollars a day seems unreasonable on
its face, the difference in the totals is almost a million dollars. Thus, the misleading nature of the formula is evident.
The court in Beagle was little bothered by the fact that the formula could be
nusleading.38 Two reasons were given for tls apparent lack of concern. First, the
compensation awarded by the jury must be reasonable. 37 If it is not, it can be
reduced or overruled by either the trial or appellate court.38 This seems to be
somewhat unsatisfactory reasoning. While it is true that the award can be modified or set aside, this can only be done if it is "so grossly disproportionate to any
3

sBeagle v. Vasold, 65 A.C. 161, 53 Cal. Rptr. 129, 417 P.2d 673 (1966); Ritzinan
v. Mills, 102 Cal. App. 464, 283 Pac. 88 (1929); Sangumetti v. Moore Dry Dock Co.,
36 Cal. 2d 812, 842, 228 P.2d 557, 575 (1951) (dissenting opinion).
S4 Beagle v. Vasold, 65 A.C. 161, 172, 53 Cal. Rptr. 129, 134, 417 P.2d 673, 678
(1966).
85
See dissenting opinion of Traynor, C.J., in Beagle v. Vasold, id. at 179, 53 Cal.
Rptr.3 at 139, 417 P.2d at 683.
6 See Beagle v. Vasold, td. at 175, 53 Cal. Rptr. at 136, 417 P.2d at 680.
37 Ibid.
3s Tbt.
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reasonable limit of compensation warranted by the facts that it shocks the court's
sense of justice and raises a presumption that it was the result of passion or preju40
dice."3 9 As a result, some awards which appear to be excessive will likely stand.
Secondly, the Beagle court said that there are meaningful safeguards to prevent
the jury from being misled. 4 ' These safeguards include self-restraint by the
plaintiff's counsel so as to avoid taxing the credulity of the jury, argument by
the defense, and the court's instructions. 42 The effectiveness of these "safeguards"
is questionable. Since the formula is misleading in that almost any amount per
period seems reasonable, plaintiff's counsel can use almost any amount without
taxing the credulity of the jury. Furthermore, when counsel is allowed to show
the jury a method of easily converting pain and suffering into dollars and cents,
it strains human nature a little too far to say that the jury will forget this easy but
deceiving solution when admonished by the judge or defendant's counsel.
The Beagle court not only dismissed the fact that the formula can be misleading, but apparently believed that such a method of computing damages is
beneficial.43 It was said that the concept of pain and suffering becomes more
meaningful and that it is easier to grasp the "worth" of pain when it is measured
in short periods of time.44 It was also said that the per diem formula provides a
more explicit "comprehension and humanization of the plaintiff's predicament
"45 If this reasoning is earned to its logical conclusion, it would seem that
the ideal method of arriving at just compensation would be achieved through a
suggestion by counsel that the jurors place themselves in the plaintiffs shoes and
determine what they would charge to undergo pain equivalent to that which the
plaintiff has undergone, e.g., to decide what the pain and suffering would be
"worth" to them. How better than to put himself in the shoes of the plaintiff
could each juror grasp the "worth" of the plaintiffs pain and suffering and comprehend Is "predicament"? However, it is uiversally held that such a suggestion
is inadmissible because it is prejudical.4 6
The Defense's Dilemma: What Can Be Done?
Although it seems evident that the per diem argument is misleading rather
than beneficial, it is now permitted in California. This being so, what defenses,
if any, are available to lessen its detrimental effect on the defendant's case?
39 Johnston v. Long, 30 Cal. 2d 54, 76, 181 P.2d 645, 650 (1947); see Seffert v.
Los Angeles Transit Lines, 56 Cal. 2d 498, 508, 15 Cal. Rptr. 161, 167, 364 P.2d 337,
343 (1961).
40 See, e.g., Seffert v. Los Angeles Transit Lines, supra note 39. In the trial court

the per diem argument had been used. Plaintiff had asked for and had been awarded
$187,903.75 as compensation for an injured foot. On appeal, reduction was denied because the trial court has great discretion in this area.
41 Beagle v. Vasold, 65 A.C. 161, 176, 53 Cal. Rptr. 129, 136-37, 417 P.2d 673,
680-81 (1966).
42 Id. at 176, 53 Cal. Rptr. at 137, 417 P.2d at 681.
43 Ibid.
44 Ibid.
a1
Id.at 177, 53 Cal. Rptr. at 137, 417 P.2d at 681.
46
E.g., Copeland v. Johnson, 63 IMI. App. 2d 361, 211 N.E.2d 387 (1965); Jackson
v. Southwestern Public Serv. Co., 66 N.M. 458, 349 P.2d 1029 (1960); Roth v. Jelden,
80 SMD. 40, 118 N.W.2d 20 (1962). See 88 C.J.S. Trial §§ 169, 191 (1955).
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The conclusion is inescapable that the defendant is faced with the dilemma
of either rebutting an argument not based on evidence, or ignoring the argument
and risking the consequences. If he ignores the argument, there is the danger of
the jury concluding that he is tacitly accepting it. If he rebuts the argument, he
has the alternative of either attacking the amount suggested for each period, and
thereby further confusing the ]ury,47 or attacking the validity of the formula as a
method of computing damages.
One who attacks the credibility of the formula will have no trouble finding
material to support his cause. 48 Many of the reasons given by the courts which
have refused to permit the use of the formula will be helpful. For example, the
attorney can impress upon the jury that it is their duty to arrive at the amount
of compensation by applying their knowledge of the value of money to the facts
in evidence, and that what they have been told by the plaintiffs counsel is not
evidence but is pure conjecture based upon his biased interests. 49 The jury could
be reminded that pain is not constant, but vanes from day to day, and any system
wlch says it is worth the same amount each day cannot be valid.50
One argument which may prove itself moderately successful m casting doubt
on the validity of the formula is the so-called T.V Argument. 51 Counsel uses the
per diem method to compute the cost of a television set. He first suggests the
value of T.V per hour. By comparing it with the cost of a movie, fifty cents an
hour seems quite reasonable. He then multiplies this figure by the number of hours
the television is watched per day. Four seems like a conservative estimate. Continumg, he multiplies the number of hours the television is watched a day by
the number of days it is watched a year; perhaps 300. Finally, he multiplies that
figure by the number of years the television set lasts; five would be minimal. The
result is that when measured on a per diem basis, the cost of a television set
should be 3,000 dollars, yet a new color set only costs about 500 dollars. This
clearly shows that although each component seems reasonable, the total reached
is unreasonable, and therefore the formula is faulty.
Finally, the attorney can request that the jury be given an instruction outlining
the criteria on which they are to base their decasion. The following is a proposed
instruction:
One of the most diffcult tasks imposed upon you as the jury is to determine
the amount of money the plaintiff is to be awarded as compensation for his pain
and suffering. No method is available by which the plaintiffs damage can be
objectively evaluated; and for this reason, no witness has been allowed to express his subjective opinion on the matter. I wish to impress upon you that any
figures or means of arriving at compensation, suggested by either counsel for the
plaintiff or counsel for the defendent, are not evidence, but are merely their
opinion as representatives of their client's interests. You as jurors know the nature
Caley v. Manicke, 29 Ill. App. 2d 323, 173 N.E.2d 209 (1961).
For an extensive list of articles and cases attacking the validity of the per diem
formula, see Beagle v. Vasold, 65 A.C. 161, 170, 53 Cal. Rptr. 129, 133, 417 P.2d 673,
677 (1965).
49
See, e.g., Caylor v. Atchison, T. & S.F By., 190 Kan. 261, 374 P.2d 53 (1962).
50
See, Crum v. Steel City Transp., Inc., 146 W Va. 421, 122 S.E.2d 18 (1961),
15 VAND. L. REv. 1303 (1962).
5
-1See LaBrum, The Best Defense Is A Good Offense, 30 INs. CouNsEL J. 124,
47See

48

128-29 (1963); 33 So. CAL. L. Rlv. 214 (1960).

